

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
ROUTING SLIP**

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR	X			
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9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
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14	D/OLL				
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SUSPENSE \_\_\_\_\_ Date

Remarks

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Executive Secretary  
8 Dec 84

Date

3637 (10-81)

7 December 1984

Executive Registry

84- 10035/2

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. William J. Casey  
 Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : [redacted] STAT

Office of Research and Development RM 736 H, Ames

SUBJECT : Creative Problem Solving--Leadership Education Program


This is to suggest initiating a formal and continuing leadership education program at the Central Intelligence Agency.

There are a lot of managers but few leaders today at the CIA. There are too many opinionless, some might even go so far as to say spineless, bureaucrats in the Agency executive, people who simply can't or won't lead, i.e. take initiative. The situation would not be so critical but for the Agency's importance in nuclear age world affairs.

What to do? First, I suggest allowing more people to rise to the highest Agency grade levels via non-management career routes, while concurrently reducing appreciably the number of management positions in the Agency; wherever there is management there is likely to be officiousness and thus bureaucracy. Second, search for good executive material via an Agency leadership education program.

Exactly how this leadership program would operate, I am not sure. Perhaps some of those who EODed at the Agency would be required to spend their first three or four years as members of Agency teams, each team having responsibility for specific Agency functions; each team member would periodically rotate into and then out of the team leader position. Each team would be overseen by a monitor whose job it would be to guide the team, mainly by directing and tutoring the team leader. The monitor, along with team members, would assess the leader's performance. Those people that came out of the program as most worthy would be candidates for the Agency executive.

The Director and Deputy Director of the CIA have to rely heavily, and in pyramid fashion, on advice from the Agency executive. Inadequate leadership can result in poor advice. Inadequate leadership is a serious problem in the CIA executive. An Agency leadership education program would help alleviate this problem and would promote a genuine esprit de corps.



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MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI

Another bullet out of the blue on Search for Excellence: note one of the signers of this memo is [redacted] who is being recommended for cash award before returning to his teaching position later this month.

I, for one, do not subscribe to the theory here that more can be learned from the study of successes than failures. On the job mistaking is part of the learning process, at least for a case officer—if one is afraid to make mistakes, one becomes overly cautious and bureaucratic. We can learn from both.

[redacted]  
8 Aug 84

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Date

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Executive Registry	
84-6039	

August 7, 1984

Mr. Director:

In response to your request for new ideas in support of the "Quest for Excellence," we suggest the creation of a small unit to conduct a systematic, critical, and creative analysis of Agency experience. Such a unit would assess both successes and failures. Its goal would be to develop an intelligence doctrine, embodying the governing principles of intelligence. The time is particularly appropriate for the creation of such a unit.

Organizations span generations and can incorporate the lessons of history in ways that individuals cannot. The more successful organizations have consciously systematized the lessons of centuries of experience as a guide for their future activities. The General Staff of the Prussian Army and certain Orders within the Roman Catholic Church are examples. CIA is now entering its second generation as a unique organization of the U.S. Government. Those officers present from the beginning, the keepers of institutional memory, grow fewer each year. Unless we begin to systematically extract the lessons of the past and to use those lessons to develop an intelligence doctrine for future intelligence officers, the organizational experience will be lost.

Much of the raw material and some of the institutions needed to collect, analyse and disseminate knowledge about the intelligence profession already exist, though in disconnected form. The Agency's History Staff has produced case studies and unit histories; other important information is archived [redacted]. The Center for the Study of Intelligence has produced some studies that bear on aspects of this issue. The Office of Training and Education provides both practical skill training and some courses that deal with the theory and practice of intelligence. Detailed post-mortems of Agency intelligence failures also exist.

What is missing is the conscious and sustained effort by the Agency's best minds to extract from these materials those general precepts of intelligence that would, if applied, improve Agency performance. Not only penetrating analysis, but a careful blend of the practical and theoretical, is required. The level of scholarly effort we have in mind is similar to that expended on the study of Agency failures. More can be learned, however, from the study of successes than from the study of isolated failures.

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We believe the results of this undertaking will be useful to all four of the Directorates. Whether the problem is the construction of a second Headquarters building, recruiting agents, quelling foreign insurgency, forecasting the behavior of foreign governments, or understanding the effects of new technologies on Agency business, we believe that there are lessons to be learned from prior Agency experience. If widely understood and practiced by Agency professionals, these lessons will form Agency doctrine. Clearly, unless doctrine influences policy and action, it serves no purpose.

The organization we envision is a simple one with highly focused goals. Of greatest importance would be high-level support for the new mission. With dynamic leadership and the continuing interest of upper management, it is likely that high-quality Agency scholars could be attracted to this important task.

We present here an idea, not a plan for implementation. If you find merit in our suggestion, we would welcome the opportunity to discuss it with you.

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Advanced Concepts Staff  
Office of Research and Development

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